THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NIC 8585-82 25 October 1982

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA

SUBJECT:

Meeting Between President Reagan and King Hassan

- 1. NSC senior NESA staff official Geoffrey Kemp gave the following summary of the meeting between President Reagan and King Hassan. General Walters was the interpreter.
- 2. Hassan asked what "guise" the PLO could utilize to permit direct contact with the United States. He referred to contacts made several years ago between General Walters and a PLO representative, and commented they had never leaked. (Comment: This is not true - the fact of them did appear in print.) The President commented the PLO must recognize Israel's right to exist. After suggesting a vague statement by the PLO which the President found ambiguous, the King asked if the following wording of a PLO statement would be sufficient to bring about contact with the United States: "All states in the area, including Israel, have the right to live as sovereign nations with secure borders." The President said he felt this would be sufficient, to which Hassan said he would attempt to obtain it from the PLO. He said it "might take several weeks, perhaps five."
- 3. King Hassan then asked how, if the PLO produces the statement, contact would occur. The President said the Ambassador in whatever locale the PLO leadership was located would make contact - or perhaps a State Department official - and then representation would be escalated in level.
- 4. The King then stated he felt the inclusion of "nationalist" West Bank politicains in Hussein's potential negotiation team would meet the requirements of the PLO for inclusion. He also strongly urged President Reagan to build up Hussein's image, receiving him in Washington soon for this purpose. (Comment: The West Bank "nationalists" would presumably include the Mayors who were dismissed by the Israelis over the past year.

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